39 – The Disabling Pacific ‘Alliance’ (15 Oct 2012)
...elections to rub it in some more that Washington would not accept independent Japanese action, nothing that deviated from how the LDP had done things. To underline that point he snubbed his counterpart by declining the invitation to the banquet that is routine for such occasions. Obama and Clinton failed to acknowledge what both Hatoyama and Ozawa sought to accomplish: to sit down with the American top, jointly to regard the changed world around them, to discuss the growing power of China along with other East Asian regional matters, and the variety of new ways that the United States and Japan could perhaps explore to cope with new problems; in other words, to do what is considered quite normal as part of an actual alliance. The new prime minister attempted three or four times to arrange for a face-to-face meeting with Obama. He was rebuffed, not through standard diplomatic channels, but implicitly and publicly by a spokesperson in Washington stating that the Japanese prime minister should not try to solve his coalition problems by wasting the president’s time. Obama had been told by advisers, as revealed by leaked information, to not give the new Japanese prime minister more than ten...