14 – The Elephant, Blind Men, and the Rhinoceros (11 Feb 09)
...to delude yourself with misunderstandings. A favorite comparison has been with the “bubble economy” of Japan and its aftermath from 1990 onward. And with that we are in the presence of blind men who have been told that they are examining an elephant, but who in fact are blindly fumbling a rhinoceros. In one among plenty of examples I just came across, two specialists working for the IMF talk about lax financial regulation in their first line. But Japanese banks are not “regulated” in the common understanding of the term, they operate under signals of the finance ministry. It was through these signals that they had changed their lending practices, which brought about the bubble. The authors picture a government struggling with orderly deleveraging while limiting moral hazard. But moral hazard implies a consciousness of risk and the conviction that someone else will bear it. Japan’s banks never acted as if they were at risk (at least not until much later in the mid 1990’s), and the ministry did not want them to act as if they were at risk. The IMF document speaks of a Japanese strategy in the aftermath of the bubble, but the officials did not know...